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WHEN IT FEELS RIGHT, GO WITH IT: AFFECTIVE REGULATION OF AFFILIATIVE SOCIAL TUNING

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Past research demonstrates that when people are motivated to affiliate with another, their beliefs and implicit attitudes spontaneously adjust toward that person's apparent beliefs, a phenomenon dubbed affiliative social tuning. Two experiments examined the role of people's mood in regulating affiliative social tuning of implicit and explicit racial prejudice. Based on the idea that positive mood encourages and negative mood discourages pursuit of accessible goals, we predicted that when participants were in positive moods, interpersonal goals and the apparent beliefs of an interaction partner would interactively shape participants' racial prejudice. In contrast, when participants were in negative moods, interpersonal goals and the apparent beliefs of an interaction partner were not expected to impact racial prejudice. Results of two experiments supported these predictions. Other ways that mood may shape affiliative social tuning are discussed.

Human beings are fundamentally social creatures (Fiske, 2004; Tice & Wallace, 2003). They go to great lengths and use a variety of strategies to form and to maintain social bonds with others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). When the achievement of social bonds is thwarted, they respond with extreme emotion, lose their ability to self-regulate, and even experience the neurological equivalent of physical pain (Williams, 2007). Research on affiliative social tuning demonstrates that one way people seek to fulfill their desire to bond with others is by allowing their attitudes, beliefs, and affective states to spontaneously adjust or "tune" toward the apparent state of people with whom they are interacting (Hardin & Conley, 2001; Sinclair & Huntsinger, 2006). The present research examines the role of mood in regulating the tendency to engage in affiliative social tuning. Based on the idea that positive

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moods encourage whereas negative moods discourage pursuit of accessible goals (Clore & Huntsinger, 2009; Fishbach & Labroo, 2007), we expected that interpersonal goals would regulate affiliative social tuning of racial prejudice for people in positive moods but not for those in negative moods.

One consequence of human sociality is the drive to share inner states with others; that is, to feel as if one understands and experiences some aspect of the world as those with whom one is interacting do (Higgins & Pittman, 2008). According to shared reality theory, achieving such a sense of perceived mutual understanding is a potent basis of social bonds (Hardin & Conley, 2001; Hardin & Higgins, 1996). This theory further implies that if social bonds depend in part on achieving a state of perceived mutual understanding (i.e., shared reality), then the motivation to form or to maintain social bonds (i.e., affiliate) with a partner should increase the desire to achieve such a state. One way people motivated to affiliate with another person may do so is by allowing relevant aspects of their inner state, such as their beliefs or affective experience, to adjust toward the apparent beliefs of their interaction partner, a process referred to as affiliative social tuning (Sinclair, Huntsinger, Skorinko, & Hardin, 2005; Sinclair, Lowery, Hardin, & Colangelo, 2005; see also Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001).

Initial indirect evidence of affiliative social tuning came from classic research on the saying-is-believing effect (see Echterhoff, Higgins, & Levine, 2009; Higgins, 1992, for reviews). In this paradigm, people read a description of a fictitious person and then produce a message about him for an audience that ostensibly has either positive or negative attitudes toward him. This research typically finds that people align messages to the apparent views of their audience, producing a message whose valence corresponds with the audience's opinion. Moreover, the valence of the message biases memory for the fictitious person, such that it also aligns with the audience's apparent view. Importantly, individual difference proxies for the motivation to affiliate regulated this audience-tuning effect. People chronically motivated to affiliate with higher status others (i.e., high authoritarians), for example, were more likely to spontaneously align their attitudes and memory with the perceived views of a high power audience than were people who were not so motivated (i.e., low authoritarians; Higgins, & McCann, 1984). Similar results have been found for high self-monitors (McCann & Hancock, 1983). In this case, high self-monitors are more likely to align their attitudes with the audience than are low self-monitors, presumably because high self-monitors are more motivated to affiliate with people in general than are low self-monitors. More recently, Echterhoff and colleagues found that having a sense of meaningful affiliation with one's partner played a role in mediating the degree of memory alignment in this paradigm (Echterhoff, Lang, Krämer, & Higgins, 2009).

Recent direct evidence of affiliative social tuning comes from research examining fluctuations in a diverse assortment of outcomes, including self-views, implicit attitudes, and affective states such as moods. Sinclair and colleagues (Sinclair, Huntsigner et al., 2005,), for example, found that women's and African Americans' self-views became more stereotype-consistent when they were motivated to affiliate with an interaction partner presumed to hold stereotype-consistent views of their gender or ethnic group than a partner presumed to have stereotype-inconsistent views of their group. Similar fluctuations in implicit ethnic attitudes as a consequence of affiliative motivation and the ostensible attitudes of an interaction partner were also discovered (Sinclair, Lowery, et al., 2005). White participants

displayed less implicit prejudice when they wanted to affiliate with an interaction partner presumed to have egalitarian attitudes than a partner with unknown ethnic attitudes.

Affiliative social tuning is not limited to cognitive outcomes such as attitudes and self-views, but also shapes affective experience, including mood and emotions. When people are about to interact with someone who elicits affiliative motivation, they preemptively absorb this person's mood, even when doing so entails feeling more negatively (Huntsinger, Lun, Sinclair, & Clore, 2009). Long-term relationships, such as those between romantic partners or roommates, elicit similar emotional convergence as a consequence of affiliative motivation—in this case relationship partners most motivated to affiliate with their partner absorb this person's general positive and negative emotional posture (Anderson, Keltner, & John, 2003).

Although these findings illustrate that affective states can be shared and that such sharing is most likely when affiliative goals are engaged, little work has examined the role of affect in initiating social sharing processes. Is it the case that people's current affective state influences the degree to which aspects of themselves tune toward the apparent views and experiences of others? The current research begins to answer this question by examining the influence of mood on affiliative social tuning. Answering this question is important for developing a full understanding of affiliative social tuning—and social sharing processes more generally—because it provides insight into how these processes are likely to unfold in daily social interactions. Experiencing affective states, such as positive or negative moods, is a ubiquitous occurrence and thus should frequently form the psychological background in which everyday social sharing unfurls.

There are several reasons to suspect that mood may shape affiliative social tuning by regulating whether people adopt or reject currently active interpersonal goals. This idea is consistent with recent research that examined the impact of positive and negative mood on pursuit of accessible goals (Fishbach & Labroo, 2007). In this research, when a self-improvement goal was primed, people in positive moods performed better on a self-control task than those in negative moods. This pattern was reversed, however, when a mood-maintenance goal was primed; in this case people in a positive mood performed worse on the self-control task than those in a negative mood.

There are several mechanisms by which mood may have regulated goal pursuit in this research (for discussion see Fishbach & Labroo, 2007). According to existing state-of-the-environment affect-cognition models, positive moods signal that the environment is safe whereas negative moods signal that the environment is problematic (Bless, 2001; Bless & Fiedler, 2006; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). If positive mood leads people to feel that the environment is safe, then accessible goals may appear more feasible or as opportunities for action, leading people to adopt them. By contrast, if negative mood leads people to feel that the environment is problematic, then accessible goals may appear less feasible or even risky, leading people to reject them (Fishbach & Labroo, 2007; Schwarz & Bohner, 1996). Another possibility is that mood directly shapes whether people view accessible goals as more or less desirable, which then shapes whether people pursue them (Clore & Huntsinger, 2009; Schwarz & Bohner, 1996). A final possibility is that the experience of positive mood activates the behavioral approach system, which leads people to adopt accessible goals, while the experience of negative mood activates the behavioral avoidance system, which leads people to reject accessible goals (Carver & White,

1994; Fishbach & Labroo, 2007). In sum, several lines of research converge on the idea that positive mood encourages people to pursue accessible goals whereas negative mood encourages people to reject accessible goals.

Given this observed relationship between current mood and goal pursuit, we hypothesize that mood may shape affiliative social tuning by regulating pursuit of interpersonal goals. When the goal to affiliate is accessible and people are experiencing positive mood, affiliative social tuning should occur, whereas when the goal to affiliate is accessible and people are experiencing negative mood, affiliative social tuning should not occur. To illustrate, consider the following example based on the research examining affiliative social tuning of implicit racial prejudice discussed above (Sinclair, Lowery, et al., 2005). If one introduces mood into the situation, people in positive moods for whom the goal to affiliate is accessible, should display less implicit racial prejudice with an egalitarian interaction partner than a partner of unknown ethnic attitudes (i.e., they should engage in social tuning). By contrast, when people are in negative moods, the goal to affiliate is not expected to moderate levels of implicit racial prejudice in response to the apparent ethnic attitudes of an interaction partner (i.e., they should not engage in social tuning).

OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT RESEARCH

We tested this hypothesis in two experiments. In Experiment 1, participants experienced a positive or negative mood induction and interacted with an experimenter who seemed to hold egalitarian attitudes toward African Americans (i.e., wore an "eracism" t-shirt), or whose ethnic attitudes were unknown. Participants' implicit racial prejudice toward African Americans was assessed using the Implicit Association Task (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwarz, 1998). The degree to which they desired to affiliate with the experimenter was measured. In Experiment 2, we manipulated the motivation to affiliate to provide critical converging evidence for our hypothesis. In this experiment, the apparent views of the experimenter were held constant by always having this person wear the "eracism" shirt. In both experiments, we predicted that social tuning in response to accessible interpersonal goals would occur for positive mood participants, but would not occur for negative mood participants.

EXPERIMENT 1

METHOD

Participants

For credit toward a course requirement, 55 White participants (37 women, 18 men), all university undergraduates, took part in this experiment.

Design

The experimental design for this experiment was a 2 (mood: positive, negative) X 2 (experimenter beliefs: egalitarian, control) between participants factorial with

participants randomly assigned to conditions. A third factor, interpersonal goals toward the experimenter, was measured (see below).

Procedure

A White experimenter wearing one of two t-shirts greeted participants. In the egalitarian condition, the t-shirt had the word *eracism* on the front. In the control condition, it was a blank t-shirt (Sinclair, Huntsinger, et al., 2005). After reading and signing the informed consent agreement, participants were told that the purpose of the experiment was to examine interpersonal interaction and attitudes toward social groups. The experimenter informed participants that they would complete a series of computer-based measures, answer a questionnaire, and complete some demographic items. The experimenter then asked participants if they would be willing to pretest musical selections for an upcoming experiment prior to beginning their main tasks. This entailed listening to a musical selection and answering a few questions about it at the end of the experiment. All participants agreed. In reality, this task served as the mood induction. Mozart's *Eine kleine Nachtmusik* was used to induce a positive mood and Mahler's *Adagietto* was used to induce a negative mood. These two musical selections are well-validated and are a frequently used means of inducing a positive or negative mood (Niedenthal & Setterlund, 1994; Storbeck & Clore, 2005, 2008; Tamir, Robinson, & Clore, 2002). The experimenter left the room once the music began and returned after approximately ten minutes.

After returning to the room, the experimenter informed participants that they needed to take an eye test to determine if their vision was normal. The eye test served no purpose other than to ensure that the manipulation of perceived experimenter beliefs was successful (e.g., Sinclair, Lowery, et al., 2005). For this "eye test," participants in the egalitarian condition read the experimenter's t-shirt (i.e., eracism) and those in the control condition read a string of random letters printed on a sheet of paper. Participants then completed the implicit racial prejudice measure and answered questions assessing their goals toward the experimenter, as well as their moods.

Materials

Implicit Racial Prejudice. Participants' implicit racial prejudice toward African Americans was assessed with the Implicit Association Test (IAT; see Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998 for a detailed treatment of this measure). The IAT assesses associations between attitude objects (e.g., African Americans and European Americans) and evaluative attributes (e.g., pleasant and unpleasant). The current study used African American and European American names and words from Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) and Lowery, Hardin, and Sinclair (2001). Participants completed the task in seven blocks following the recommendations of Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji (2005). Response latency measurement followed the recommendations of Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003) and all reported analyses used the *D-600* measure of implicit racial prejudice toward African Americans. Higher numbers on this measure indicate greater implicit racial prejudice.

Affiliative Goal. To assess participants' goals toward the experimenter, they were asked three questions: "How much did you want to get along with the experimenter?"; "How much did you want to have a smooth interaction with the experimenter?"; and "How much did you like the experimenter" (1 = *not at all* to 10 = *very much*). Participants' responses to the items were averaged (α = .76) to form a composite measure of participants' affiliative goal (M = 7.90, SD = 1.18).

Mood Check. As a manipulation check, participants were asked to rate how happy and sad (reverse scored) they felt while they listened to the musical selection on a scale ranging from -3 (*not at all*) to 3 (*very much*). These items were correlated, $r(55) = .62$, $p < .0005$, and their average formed the measure of mood.

Experimenter Beliefs. Participants' perceptions of the experimenter's beliefs were assessed with four questions (e.g., "How likely is it that the experimenter believes discrimination against African Americans is a problem?"). The four questions were averaged (α = .77) to create a measure of perceptions of the experimenter's beliefs.

RESULTS

Manipulation Checks and Other Measures

To examine the efficacy of the mood and experimenter beliefs manipulations, each manipulation check was submitted separately to a 2 (mood: positive, negative) X 2 (experimenter beliefs: egalitarian, control) between participants analysis of variance (ANOVA). The manipulation of mood was successful. Participants in the positive-mood condition felt more positive (M = 1.98; SD = 0.85) than those in the negative-mood condition (M = .98; SD = 1.44), $F(1, 51) = 9.04$, $p = .004$, $\eta_p^2 = .16$. Neither the main effect of experimenter beliefs, $F(1, 51) = .01$, $p > .9$, nor the interaction, $F(1, 51) = .61$, $p > .4$, were significant. The manipulation of experimenter beliefs was also successful. Participants in the egalitarian beliefs condition felt the experimenter had more egalitarian beliefs (M = 7.62; SD = 1.22) than did those in the control condition (M = 6.86; SD = 1.31), $F(1, 51) = 4.61$, $p < .05$, $\eta_p^2 = .08$. Neither the main effect of mood, $F(1, 51) = .47$, $p > .4$, nor the interaction, $F(1, 51) = .1$, $p > .7$, were significant.

Finally, the affiliative goal measure was submitted to the ANOVA described above to examine whether it was affected by the manipulations. Responses to the affiliative goal measure were not influenced by the mood manipulation, $F(1, 51) = .12$, $p > .7$, the perceived beliefs of the experimenter, $F(1, 51) = 1.71$, $p > .15$, or their interaction, $F(1, 51) = .63$, $p > .4$. As such, it is reasonable to treat responses to this measure as another independent variable in the analyses below.

Implicit Racial Prejudice

We hypothesized that social tuning of implicit racial prejudice in response to accessible interpersonal goals would occur for positive mood participants, but not negative mood participants. To test this prediction we submitted participants' IAT *D-600* scores to a multiple regression analysis. In the model, mood (1 = positive; -1 = negative) and experimenter beliefs (1 = egalitarian; -1 = control) were contrast-



FIGURE 1. Positive-mood participants' expression of implicit prejudice as a function of their social goal and perceived beliefs of the interaction partner (Experiment 1).

coded categorical predictors and affiliative motivation was a continuous mean-centered predictor. Product terms were created by multiplying the three predictors to create three two-way interactions and one three-way interaction. This analysis revealed only the predicted three-way interaction, b = -.11 (.03), $t(47)$ = -3.27, p < .005.

To more fully understand the pattern of this three-way interaction, we examined positive- and negative-mood participants separately. Following Aiken and West (1991), significant interactions were decomposed via simple slope analyses. As expected, the underlying two-way interaction for positive-mood participants was significant, b = -.20 (.04), $t(22)$ = -4.90, p < .005 (see Figure 1). Simple slopes analysis showed that when affiliative motivation was one standard deviation above the mean, positive mood led to affiliative social tuning. Participants expressed less implicit racial prejudice when the experimenter wore the eracism t-shirt than the blank t-shirt, b = -.12 (.06), $t(22)$ = -2.00, p = .058. When affiliative motivation was one standard deviation below the mean, positive-mood participants seemed to engage in anti-tuning (e.g., Sinclair, Huntsinger et al., 2005; see also Higgins, 1992), expressing more implicit racial prejudice when the experimenter wore the eracism t-shirt than the blank t-shirt, b = .28 (.06), $t(22)$ = 4.67, p < .0005. Importantly, and also as expected, negative-mood participants did not engage in social tuning; the underlying two-way interaction for negative-mood participants was not significant, b = .01 (.05), $t(25)$ = .19, p = .86.

EXPERIMENT 2

Consistent with past research demonstrating mood regulation of goal pursuit (e.g., Fishbach & Labroo, 2007), Experiment 1 showed that affiliative social tuning

occurred for participants in positive moods but not negative moods. Only among positive mood participants did interpersonal goals and the ostensible race-relevant beliefs of their interaction partner collaboratively shape their display of implicit racial prejudice. Specifically, positive-mood participants who reported a high desire to affiliate with the experimenter expressed less implicit racial prejudice when this experimenter was wearing an eracism t-shirt versus a blank t-shirt. By contrast, positive-mood participants who expressed relatively little desire to affiliate with the experimenter expressed more implicit racial prejudice when this person was wearing an eracism t-shirt versus a blank t-shirt. Although not necessarily expected, such anti-tuning has been documented previously and has been shown to be better understood as a means of maintaining social distance by thwarting the development of shared reality than as a product of states such as reactance (e.g., Sinclair, Huntsinger et al., 2005). In light of this interpretation, one might wonder if the relatively low desire to affiliate expressed in the current study can be equated with the desire to gain social distance. However, given that people generally report some positive amount of resting affiliative motivation toward others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), it is possible that one standard deviation below the mean on this variable is experienced as distancing rather than simply neutrality.

In Experiment 2, we conceptually replicated Experiment 1 by manipulating —as opposed to measuring —participants' interpersonal goals in order to demonstrate the causal role of interpersonal goals. To this end, we subtly manipulated whether participants approached the interaction with the experimenter motivated by the goal to affiliate or to gain social distance using well-validated goal-priming methods (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). Contrasting the goal to affiliate with the goal to gain social distance reduces ambiguity about the motivational state of some participants discussed above. In addition, the benefits of manipulating participants' goals via priming were twofold. First, doing so allowed us to directly demonstrate the role of interpersonal goals and mood in regulation of affiliative social tuning of implicit racial prejudice. Second, it allowed us to ask if social tuning processes that are instigated by primed goals are similarly regulated by mood as the conscious affiliative goal in Experiment 1. To simplify the design of Experiment 2, participants always interacted with an ostensibly egalitarian experimenter (i.e., the experimenter always wore an "eracism" t-shirt). Finally, we measured both implicit and explicit racial prejudice in this experiment.

METHOD

Participants

Thirty-one White participants (25 women, 6 men), all university undergraduates, took part in the experiment for credit toward a course requirement.

Design

The experimental design for this experiment was a 2 (mood: positive, negative) X 2 (goal: affiliate, gain social distance) between participants factorial with participants randomly assigned to conditions.

Materials and Procedure

The materials and procedure were similar to Experiment 1, with several exceptions. First, the experimenter always wore an "eracism" t-shirt. Second, participants completed scrambled-sentence tasks that primed either affiliation or social distance goals, as used successfully in other research (Huntsinger, Lun, Sinclair, & Clore, 2009). To obscure the true purpose of the priming task, participants were informed that the tasks were part of pretesting for another experiment. The instructions and basic format of the priming tasks were based on the guidelines outlined by Bargh and Chartrand (2000). Each scrambled-sentence task was composed of 20 sentences. In the affiliation goal version, participants generated 12 sentences involving concepts such as getting along and having smooth interactions with others as well as 8 neutral items. Examples of these sentences include, "I want to get along with others" and "I want to have a smooth interaction with him." In the social distance goal version, along with the 8 neutral sentences, participants generated 12 sentences involving concepts such as *not* getting along and having social distance from others. Examples of these sentences included, "Jane feels distant from Adam" and "I cannot relate to him today." The full scrambled-sentence tasks are available from the first author. In all cases, the experimenter was unaware of which priming task participants were given.

Participants listened to the musical selections for approximately 4 minutes before they began unscrambling sentences used to prime the two interpersonal goals. The music continued playing while participants completed all 20 sentences. Participants then completed the "eye exam," the measures of implicit and explicit racial prejudice, and the manipulation checks. All other materials, except the additional measure of explicit prejudice, were the same as in Experiment 1. Reliabilities were as follows: mood manipulation check (r = .73), perceived experimenter beliefs (α = .90), and affiliative goal (α = .88).

Explicit Racial Prejudice. Explicit prejudice was measured via the symbolic (Henry & Sears, 2002) and modern racism (McConahay, 1986) scales (αs = .83 and .70, respectively). The two measures were highly correlated (r = .71), and were therefore averaged to create a single measure of explicit prejudice. Due to experimenter error, three participants' responses to the explicit prejudice measures were lost.

RESULTS

Hypotheses were tested by submitting relevant measures to a 2 (mood: positive, negative) X 2 (goal: affiliate, gain social distance) between participants ANOVA.

Manipulation Checks

The mood manipulation was successful. Participants in the positive-mood condition expressed somewhat more positive mood (M = 1.60, SD = 1.20) than participants in the negative-mood condition (M = .88, SD = 1.19), $F(1, 27) = 3.19$, $p < .05$, one-tailed, $\eta_p^2 = .11$. Neither the main effect of goal, $F(1, 27) = 2.31$, $p > .14$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$, nor the interaction, $F(1, 27) = 1.13$, $p > .28$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$, were significant.



FIGURE 2a. Implicit prejudice as a function of primed social goal and manipulated mood (Experiment 2).

Since the experimenter's ostensible beliefs were held constant, participants' perceptions of these beliefs did not differ across conditions ($M = 7.77$, $SD = 1.41$): main effect of mood, $F(1, 27) = .17$, $p > .6$, goal, $F(1, 27) = .12$, $p > .7$, and their interaction, $F(1, 27) = .00$, $p > .9$. The mean on this measure was significantly above the midpoint of the scale, indicating that participants thought the experimenter's beliefs were egalitarian, $t(30) = 8.95$, $p < .005$, $d = 3.26$.

Participants were given a funneled debriefing (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). No participants expressed awareness of the purpose of the goal-priming task, nor did they connect it to the interaction with the experimenter or their responses on any measures. Further, participants' reports of the goal to affiliate did not vary across conditions, main effect of mood, $F(1, 27) = .45$, $p > .4$, goal, $F(1, 27) = .63$, $p > .4$, or their interaction, $F(1, 27) = .79$, $p > .35$. In past research, a failure to find self-reported differences in motivation as a consequence of goal-priming, coupled with the results of a funneled debriefing like the one described above, is taken to indicate that the goal operated outside of conscious awareness (e.g., Bargh, Gallwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trotschel, 2001). Note that the measure of affiliation motivation exhibited high reliability; thus, the failure to detect changes in this measure cannot be attributed to its poor reliability.

Implicit and Explicit Racial Prejudice

Because the experimenter always appeared egalitarian, we predicted that positive-mood participants would display less implicit and explicit racial prejudice when primed with the goal to affiliate than with the goal to gain social distance, but the implicit and explicit racial prejudice of negative-mood participants would be unresponsive to the primed interpersonal goals. Because past research generally finds that implicit and explicit racial prejudice are only modestly correlated (Nosek et al., 2007), and a similar pattern emerged in this experiment ($r = .27$, $p = .16$), we tested the aforementioned prediction by separately submitting these measures to the ANOVA described above.



FIGURE 2b. Explicit prejudice as a function of primed social goal and manipulated mood (Experiment 2).

When the measure of implicit racial prejudice was submitted to this analysis, the predicted interaction between mood and goal prime was significant, $F(1, 27) = 7.55$, $p = .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .22$ (see Figure 2a). The main effect of mood, $F(1, 27) = 1.07$, $p > .25$, and goal, $F(1, 27) = .07$, $p > .7$, were not significant. Positive-mood participants primed with the goal to affiliate displayed less implicit racial prejudice than those primed with the goal to gain social distance, $t(27) = 2.09$, $p = .05$, $d = .81$. Interestingly, the implicit racial prejudice of negative-mood participants showed a nonsignificant trend in the opposite direction as a function of primed social goal, $t(27) = 1.79$, $p = .09$, $d = .69$.

When the measure of explicit racial prejudice was submitted to the same analysis as above, the predicted interaction between mood and goal prime was again significant, $F(1, 24) = 14.41$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .38$ (see Figure 2b). The main effect of mood, $F(1, 24) = 1.37$, $p > .2$, and goal, $F(1, 24) = .03$, $p > .8$, were not significant. Positive-mood participants primed with the goal to affiliate displayed less explicit racial prejudice than those primed with the goal to gain social distance, $t(24) = 2.56$, $p = .017$, $d = 1.04$. The explicit racial prejudice of negative-mood participants showed a significant trend in the opposite direction as a function of primed social goal, $t(24) = 2.81$, $p = .01$, $d = 1.15$.[1]

1. One could interpret the findings for implicit and explicit prejudice as stemming from the combination of positive and negative affect induced by the goal primes and mood induction. Participants in the inconsistent conditions (i.e., affiliative goal/negative mood, social distance goal/positive mood), for example, may have experienced discomfort by the clashing affective feelings and concepts and attributed this negative reaction to outgroups, leading to greater implicit and explicit prejudice. Participants in the consistent conditions (i.e., affiliative goal/positive mood, social distance goal/negative mood), may have experienced comfort and attributed this positive reaction to outgroups, leading to lesser implicit and explicit prejudice. Such an account, however, is incompatible with recent work on affective coherence versus incoherence (Centerbar, Schnall, Clore, & Garvin, 2008). This work suggests that individuals experiencing affective inconsistency, or "incoherence," are *less* likely to show typical response patterns such as ingroup bias compared to those who experience affective consistency or "coherence."

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The present research examined the role of people's mood in regulating affiliative social tuning of racial prejudice. Based on research demonstrating that people in positive moods are more likely to pursue goals than those in negative moods (Fishbach & Labroo, 2007; Schwarz & Bohner, 1996), we predicted that affiliative social tuning would occur for participants in positive moods but not for those in negative moods. Results of the two experiments supported these predictions.

In Experiment 1, when interpersonal goals were measured, we found that positive-mood participants who expressed a relatively strong desire to affiliate with the experimenter displayed less implicit racial prejudice when the experimenter was wearing an "eracism" t-shirt than a blank t-shirt. By contrast, positive-mood participants who expressed a relatively weak desire to affiliate with the experimenter displayed more implicit racial prejudice when the experimenter was wearing an "eracism" t-shirt than a blank t-shirt. Given ambiguity about how relatively low affiliative motivation is experienced, such anti-tuning was not necessarily expected; however, similar anti-tuning has been documented previously and is best understood as a means of maintaining social distance by thwarting the development of shared reality (e.g., Sinclair, Huntsinger et al., 2005). Finally, and critical to unraveling the role of mood in regulating social tuning, negative-mood participants did not differ in their implicit racial prejudice as a function of their interpersonal goals and the experimenter's apparent view. In other words, as expected, negative-mood participants did not engage in affiliative social tuning.

In Experiment 2, positive or negative mood participants interacted with an ostensibly egalitarian partner and the goal to affiliate with this person or to gain social distance from this person was subtly primed, as opposed to measured as in Experiment 1. Consistent with predictions, when participants were in positive moods they engaged in affiliative social tuning. They displayed less implicit and explicit prejudice when primed with the goal to affiliate with rather than socially distance themselves from their egalitarian interaction partner. In contrast, when participants were in negative moods, they rejected primed interpersonal goals toward their egalitarian interaction partner. They displayed greater implicit and explicit prejudice when primed with the goal to affiliate with than to socially distance themselves from this person.

Although unexpected, this negative-mood reversal is consistent with past research on mood influences on pursuit of primed goals, and more generally, of mood regulation of cognition. In the former research, the behavior of participants in negative moods contrasted away from the influence of primed goals, presumably because they rejected those goals (e.g., Fishbach & Labroo, 2007). Comparable rejection of accessible mental content has also been observed more generally in a variety of domains. In this research, for example, the attitudes and behavior of people in negative moods contrasted away from the influence of primed social categories (i.e., the elderly versus young), information processing styles (i.e., global-local focus), and stereotypes (for a review, see Clore & Huntsinger, 2009). In sum, it appears that negative mood not only interferes with pursuit of primed goals and mental content, but also encourages people to avoid their impact on behavior and cognition. Interestingly, similar mood-based contrast effects do not typically occur when motivational states or other mental content is measured, as in Experiment 1

(Huntsinger & Smith, 2009). Future research should determine the basis of these differing responses to negative mood.

In sum, these experiments integrate two seemingly unrelated lines of research, that on affective regulation of goal pursuit and shared reality theory, in a first step toward identifying the affective precursors of social tuning. In doing so, they illustrate that the relationship between affect and social sharing processes may depend on accessible interpersonal goals. One could have assumed that positive affect would universally promote a sociable interpersonal orientation that evoked social sharing, while negative affect would promote a misanthropic interpersonal orientation that thwarted social sharing (e.g., Forgas, 2002; Isen, 1987). However, this assumption was not borne out in our findings. Mood did not significantly influence the degree to which people expressed a desire to affiliate with an interaction partner. Moreover, in both experiments, people in positive moods who did not wish to affiliate with the experimenter actually engaged in anti-tuning. This shows that positive mood does not necessarily directly induce social sharing; rather, its influence depends critically on what goals are active at the moment.

FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

The present results are consistent with past research demonstrating that people in positive moods are more likely than those in negative moods to pursue primed goals (Fishbach & Labroo, 2007; Schwarz & Bohner, 1996). It would be interesting in future research to explore the exact mechanism (or mechanisms) by which mood regulates pursuit of accessible social goals and thus affiliative social tuning of implicit racial prejudice. Mood may affect the degree to which people see accessible goals as desirable (Clore & Huntsinger, 2009; Schwarz & Bohner, 1996) or feasible in light of the apparent safety of the environment (Fishbach & Labroo, 2007; Schwarz & Bohner, 1996). Given the myriad ways that affect may shape cognition more generally, and goal pursuit more specifically (for discussions, see Clore & Huntsinger, 2009; Schwarz & Bohner, 1996), mood may regulate affiliative social tuning via any one or all of these pathways.

In the future, it would also be interesting to examine whether mood might influence shared reality processes in other ways. For example, positive mood is often linked to a more global focus or processing style (i.e., a focus on the forest and not the trees), whereas negative mood is linked to a more local focus or processing style (i.e., a focus on the trees and not the forest; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Gasper & Clore, 2002). Perhaps, in some circumstances, instead of shaping pursuit of social goals, mood may influence the kinds of shared reality that people seek to attain with others. For example, because people in positive moods tend to take a global focus, they may respond to a partner imparting an egalitarian message broadly, engaging in affiliative social tuning of their attitudes toward a number of stigmatized groups. In contrast, people in negative moods may respond to the egalitarian message more narrowly engaging in affiliative social tuning of their attitudes toward only a single group. In addition to regulating whether people seek out a global or local shared reality with others, mood may shape the types of shared realities that people find pleasing. People in positive moods, as compared to negative moods, for instance, may find shared realities that focus on a social group as a whole more pleasing than those that focus on specific individuals with-

in the group. As can be seen, the influence of mood on shared reality processes is potentially complex and deserving of future research.

CLOSING

Consistent with the idea that mood regulates pursuit of goals (Fishbach & Labroo, 2007) we found that people in positive moods pursued their interpersonal goals by engaging in affiliative social tuning but people in negative moods did not do so. For people in positive moods, but not those in negative moods, goals to affiliate with or to gain distance from another dictated whether their implicit racial attitudes became in tune with that person's apparent race-relevant beliefs. This work represents an initial step in discovering how affect shapes social sharing processes. The present research suggests a complex picture of how mood regulates the tendency to seek out shared reality with others, and social interaction more generally. Rather than directly instigating or thwarting a particular outcome, the relationship between mood and social sharing depended on the interpersonal goals people had in mind.

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